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DOES THE POWER TO ALIENATE IN FEE SIMPLE
DEFEAT AN EXECUTORY DEVISE?
U NDER the common law one who held an estate in lands in fee
simple absolute was the sole owner of such lands, and 1his-
right to enjoy the estate and exercise all the powers and privileges
incident thereto could not be restricted by the devisor or grantor.
The rights and privileges incident to an estate in fee simple con-
stituted the estate-they were all essential, they were its bone,
sinew and blood, and in the absence of any one of them the estate
was regarded as less than a fee simple. Among those essential
rights were the right of possession, the right to alienate by deed, or
devise by will, or to have the estate descend to the heir at law.
Since those rights are incident to a fee simple, when a testator
devises such an estate, the devisee obtains those rights, not under
the will but as incident to the estate devised. Giving and with-
holding being incompatible acts, a testator can not devise an estate
in fee simple and withhold from the devisee any of the rights, priv-
ileges and powers, incident and essential to the estate devised.
This rule of law, or rule of property, is clearly stated by Justice
James, in Stringer's Case':-
"It is settled by authority, that if you give a man some property, real or
personal, to be his absolutely, then you cannot by your will, dispose of that
property which becomes his. You cannot say that, if he does not spend
it, if he does not give it away, if he does not will it, that which he bappened
to have in his possession, or in his drawer, or in his pocket at the time of his
death, shall not go to his heir at law if it is realty, or to his next of kin if
it is personal, or to his creditors who may have a paramount claim to it.
You cannot do that if you once vest property absolutely in the first donee.
That is because that which is once vested in a man, and vested de facto in
him, cannot be taken from him out of the due course of devolution at his
death by any expression of wish on the part of the original testator."
It follows that this rule of property does not permit a testator to
limit a remainder, or a fee simple, after a fee simple. The testator
1 6 C. Div. 1.2
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having given the first devisee a fee simple, has necessarily given him
every whit of the estate and he has nothing left to give to another;
in such a case there can by no possibility be a remainder. Neither
may the testator limit, restrict or direct the exercise of the rights and
powers incident to the estate given and, therefore, if he seeks to
restrict the devisee's power to alienate or to devise, all such'
restrictions are void as repugnant to the estate devised, or, in other
words, having given him the power to alienate and devise, he can-
not withhold those powers, and penalize the devisee if he exercises
or refrains from exercising any of them.
This common law rule of property is not found in the Scotch law.
Under the common law of Scotland a testator may devise a fee sim-
ple, which the devisee has the unrestricted power to alienate in fee
or to devise, with a proviso that if the devisee dies intestate without
issue, the estate shall go to a devisee named. Thus there may be
a devise in fee to the first taker and in the event indicated, a devise
in fee to a second devisee. This rule of the Scotch law was clearly
stated by the judges in Barstow v. Black.1  Testator devised certain
premises to his brother and-
"To his heirs and assigns whomsoever ....... . without preju-
dice in any respect to, or limilation, . . . to exercise the most full end
absolute control in the disposal of said estates and effects, either during his
lifetime, or by settlements or other writings, to take effect at his death, that
in the event of his dying intestate and without leaving heirs of his body, and
of his not otherwise disposing of the subjects and estate hereby conveyed to
him, the same shall fall and devolve . . .to the persons after-mentioned."
Lord Cairns speaking of the validity of this executory devise
said:-
"The position of an unlimited fiar. with a conditional gift over is
unknown to the English lawi but the position of an unlimited fiar-that is,
a fiar with unlimited power of ownership and disposition,-followed by sub-
stitutions or limitatiom over is well known to the Scotch law."
Lord Westbury remarked: -
"This is the proper province of a conditional substitution. In the Eng-
lish law of real property it is called a conditional limitation. But there is
this important difference between the two systems. By the English law the
grantee in fee subject to a shifting use or conditional limitation, cannot defeat
the limitation, or prevent its taking effect, but in Scotland the first disponee
is absolute fiar, and, unless fettered, may, by alienation inter vivos, or set-
tlement mortis causa, make an absolute conveyance of the estate .
In England you cannot make a gift over dependant on a condition
which is repugnant to the estate first given. Neither can you prohibit the
1 1 Sc. &Div. App.,392.
HeinOnline  -- 1 Mich. L. Rev. 428 1902-1903
POWER 7O ALIENATE AND EXECUTORY DEVISES 429
first taker from doing something which it is incidental to his estate that he
should be able to do, and take away the estate from him on his breach of the
prohibition. Nothing of that kind however, occurs here. The law attaches
to the disposition in favor of Alexander Dunn (the devisee) and his heirs the
right of alienation intervivos, or nortis causa, and the words of the gift over,
if Alexander Dunn shall not have exercised this right of alienation, thereby
remaining fiar of the estate, and shall die leaving no issue, are not at variance
with, or derogatory from, the prior estate, but simply in affihmance of what
the law has already said ..... ... The legal mind is often the victim of
its own ingenuity. The language of the deed, when read by a man offlain
understanding simply amounts to this: it Alexander Dunn dies without leav-
ing issue, I make a different disposition of my estate, but this is not to affect
the right of Alexander Dunn to dispone of the estate by deed or will."
The state of Alabama has adopted, substantially, the Scotch
rule, her statutes permitting a fee simple to be limited upon a fee
simple.'
This rule of property, that the right to the free and unrestricted
use of all the powers and privileges incident to the ownership of
property cannot be abridged or unreasonably trammeled, which
was adopted for the purpose of protecting and promoting the interest
of both the owner of property and the public, has been disregarded
in certain cases, when the reason which sustains the rule fails.
Williams v. Ask, 2 was a case where a Mrs. Greenfield devised a
number of slaves to her nephew, "provided he shall not carry them
out of the state of Maryland, or sell them to any one; in either of
which events, I will and desire said negroes to be free for life."
The nephew sold one of the slaves, Ash, who thereupon petitioned
the court to be declared a free man. It was contended by counsel
representing the master who had purchased Ash, that the condition
which supported the executory devise was void, since it was a
restraint upon alienation. The contention was not without force.
Under the law permitting this kind of property the master had a
right, incident to the estate held, to sell his slave or transport him.
But this property was of a special and peculiar description. And
so far as the public was concerned, the courts have always consid-
ered that the public good would be promoted by its abolition and
the rights of the subject of that kind of property were sometimes
regarded with favor by them. Chief Justice Taney delivered the
opinion of the court, saying:-
"It is said that this was a restraint on alienation inconsistent with the
right of property bequeathed by the will. But if, instead of giving freedom
to the slave, he had been bequeathed to some third person, in the event of
I Hoodv. Eramlett. 105 Ala. 660. 2 42 U. S. (U How.) 1.
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his being sold, or removed out of the state by the first taker, it is evident
upon common law principles, that the limitation over would have been good.
• * We think that the bequest in the will was a conditional limita-
tion of freedom to the petitioner and that it took effect the moment he was
sold."
If the subject of the property had been a horse, instead of a man,
it is very far from evident that the limitation over, in case of sale,
would have been good upon common law principles. Human lib-
erty is of more importance than a mere rule of property. The chief
justice stood by freedom and against the rule, but he failed to define
his position and while his conclusion is sound the reasons given
cannot be commended.
The supreme court of the United States and the courts of very
many states have sustained what is known as spendthrift trusts.
A testator desiring to make provision for the support and mainten-
ance of a bankrupt or spendthrift, devises property in trust for such
a person with a proviso that the absolute interest in the property so
devised shall not be taken by creditors or alienated by the cestui
que trust. This is clearly a restriction upon the enjoyment of rights
incident to the estate devised, but the restriction is upheld on the
ground that the property devised, being that of the testator, the
creditors of the bankrupt have no claim upon it and because the
benefit the testator desires to confer upon the devisee can only be
accomplished by enforcing the limitations. So far as the public is
concerned, it has not been injured and has, perhaps, been bene-
fited by being relieved from supporting the spendthrift and those
dependent upon him.'
But while this rule of the common law, that a fee cannot be
limited after a fee has been upheld by the courts, they have, at the
same time, recognized the power of a testator to devise a fee which
may terminate upon the happening of some event, and his power to
designate the person who shall in that event take the estate. This
gift over is termed an executory devise.
2
The testator, in Pellsv. Brwn,3 devised lands to the devisee and
the heirs of his body, provided that if he died leaving no issue
him surviving the estate should go to X. The devisee suffered a
common recovery. In an action by X to recover the lands from the
purchaser, it was claimed by defendant that the estate devised was
I Nichols v. Eaton. 91 U. S. 716; Broadway Bank v. Adams. 133 Mass. 170.
s Pens v. Brown, 2 Cro. 590 (1620); Porter v. Bradley, 3 D. & E. 146; Roe v. Jeffery. 7 D. & E.
590.
a 2 Cro. 590.
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an estate tail, and that, by suffering a common recovery, the tenant
had barred the entail and conveyed an estate in fee simple. The
court held that the estate devised was not a fee tail but a fee
determinable upon the death of the devisee without issue; and that
the common recovery did not bind X as he was not by privity of
estate or otherwise a party to those proceedings. This case estab-
lished two important principles: first, that a fee can be devised
which shall terminate upon the happening of a designated event
with an executory devise over; and second, that the devisee has no
power incident to the estate devised to defeat such executory devise.
The rule established by Pells v. 'Brown, does not change or
modify the common law rule, that a fee simple cannot be devised
and the devisee's power to enjoy the estate given be restricted or
limited. An estate, under the rule laid down in Pells v. Brown,
upon a conditional limitation may be devised with an executory
devise over, but such an estate is not a fee simple, and the import-
ant and essential elements of a fee simple-power to alienate, to
devise and have the estate descend to the heir at law,-are not
incident to that estate. The devisee has no power, incident to the
estate devised, to defeat the executory devise.
The essential difference between an estate in fee simple absolute
and in fee simple upon a conditional limitation is this: the tenant
of a fee simple absolute has the right and power incident to the
estate given, to alienate, to devise and have the estate descend to
his heirs, while the tenant of a determinable fee possesses no such
power incident to that estate. Consequently if the testator gives
the devisee an estate in fee simple, any condition or restriction upon
his power to alienate is void as repugnant to the grant; but if he
gives a determinable fee, any alienation in fee simple by the devisee
is void, since the estate granted him is less than a fee simple and
•here is no power incident to the estate to enlarge, change or
modify it. The words granting these two estates are similar. The
testator usually devises real j roperty to the devisee and his heirs.
The condition and limitation, then follows, provided, or, in lhe
event, etc, followed by the executory devise over.
It is sometimes difficult to determine whether the devisee takes
an absolute or a determinable fee, the words of grant being the
same in both cases. To ascertain therefore the nature of his estate
we must look to the whole will and especially to that part creating
the executory devise. The condition upon which the estate is
limited must be valid. Under the rule of the common law, which
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we have stated, if an absolute fee is devised, any limitation depend-
ing upon a condition that the devisee shall not exercise some right
incident to the estate given is void. An estate cannot be given and
the donee denied the right to enjoy that estate. This principle
has been established by a large number of cases.1 In Ware v.
Cann,2 the devise was to A and his heirs, but if A dies without
heirs then to B or, in case A offers to mortgage, or to suffer a fine
or a comnon recovery, then to B, etc. The court held that A took
an estate in fee and therefore the conditions were void; "dying
without heirs," could not be held as meaning "dying without
issue," following in that regard, Iord Hardwicke in Filburgh v.
Barbut.8 The other conditions were all restraints upon the enjoy-
ment of the estate given. In Bradley v. Peixoto,4 bank stock was
devised to A, provided that if he attempted to dispose of any part
of -it, he should forfeit his interest in the whole, and the property
should go to another. The court held the gift absolute and the
condition void as being a restraint upon selling, which was a power
incident to such a gift. In Ross v. Ross,5 personal property was
devised to A on his attaining the age of twenty-five, or at any time
after attaining twenty-one in the discretion of the executors named,
with a devise over if A should not dispose of it by will or other-
wise. The court held again that the gift was absolute and the con-
dition supporting the executory devise void because a restraint upon
alienation. In .foward v. Caresi,6 there was a devise of real estate
in fee simple. The supreme court in that case says:-
"This will gives, first, an estate in fee simple to Samuel Carusi; it con-
tabus, second, the expression of a hope and trust that he will not unneces-
sarily diminish the estate; and, third, it gives to the nieces of the testator so
much of his estate as Samuel Carusi shall not at his death have disposed of
by will or devise."
Since the estate devised was in fee simple, the executory devise
over was void. The rule seems to be well established that the
event which shall terminate a fee and perwit an executory devise
over to be created, must not be the refusal or neglect of the devisee
to exercise any right or power incident to the estate devised.
- Suppose a testator devises lands to A and his heirs, provided
that if A dies without leaving issue him surviving, then to B, and
I Ware v. Cann, 10B. & C. 433; Bradley v. Peimoto, 3 Yes. 324; Cuthbert v. Purrier, Jac.
415; Ross v. Ross. I Jac. & W. 154; Howard v. Carusi. 109 U. S. 725.
21 B. & C. 433. 3 1 ves. Sr. 89. 
4 3 Ves. 324.
I lJac. &W. 154. 6 109U. S. 725.
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the testator, by the express terms of the will gives A the power to
alienate the lands devised in fee simple, and to thus defeat the
executory devise as to all lands actually alienated; what effect will
such a power have upon the executory devise of the lands not
alienated? Different courts give conflicting answers. This precise
question came first before the English courts in Doe v. Glover.1 The
testator gave his wife an estate for life in certain lands, remainder
to his son A, in fee, provided, "If A shall die leaving no issue, and
shall not have disposed and parted with his interest in such lands,"
then the estate should go to E. A died testate, without issue. A
contest arose over the title between the devisee claiming under the
will of the son, and the claimant of the executory devise under the
father's will. The court found that the son took an estate in the
lands devised in fee upon a conditional limitation, death without
issue, and that the will gave him the power to alienate the lands
devised in fee simple. The language of the judges is clear and
explicit, and leaves no doubt as to the scope'of the decision. Chief
Justice Tindal said:
"The testator, in the first place, gives the estate to his son and to his heirs,
should he have any; and he gives him full power to dispose of it in his life-
time."
Cresswell, J. :-
"I am entirely of the same opinion. ... There was
no condition that was repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the prior devise
to the son. The son might have prevented the devise over from taking effect,
by disposing of the property in his lifetime. But, in the event of his not
exercising that power, the estate is given over."
Erle. J.:-
"The intention of the testator evidently was, to give to his son absolute
dominion over the estate, provided he chose to exercise that dominion in his
lifetime, but not to leave to him the selection of the object of his bounty by
his will. Such appears to me to have been the intention of the testator; and
I thinkthe words he has used are incompatible with any other construction."
Not only do the judges state that the son, under his father's will,
took a determinable fee, and was given by the will power to alienate
in fee, a power not incident to the estate given him, but.the argu-
ment of counsel make this if possible still clearer. Counsel for the
claimant, under the son's will, argued that the son took a fee
simple, since he had the power to alienate in fee, and therefore the
condition which supported the executory devise, of all the lands
devised, not alienated, was void. To sustain that contention he
1 1 Com. B. 448 (1845).
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quoted from Jarman on Wills. The chief justice interrupted
with the remark:-
"The author is there shewing the distinction between conditions strictly
so-called and limitations. The limitation over here is clearly good."
Doe v. Glover has never been overruled. Its authority has been
weakened by criticis'us made by the judges in Holmes v. Godson,'
and Shaw v. ford' The criticisms, however, are mere dicta.
This question was not . ' in Holmes v. Godson. There the
testator devised lands in i. his son, provided that if the son
should not make a will, su.' .ands should go to X.
Justice Turner states the question involved in Holmes v. Godson,
as follows:-
"The sole question, therefore, on the plaintiff's title is, whether the fee
which was thus vested in the son was defeated, and the estate carried over
to .the widow and Mr. Godson, by the event which happened, of the son
having afterwards died without having made a will."
Justice Turner in his opinion refers to, and relies principally upon
Gulliver v. Vaux.3 That is a case on all fours with Holmes v.
Godson. In that case the testator, after having devised certain
lands to his three sons, in fee, adds:-
"And for prevention of any difference which may hereafter arise concern-
ing the inheritance of my real estate, in case it shall so happen that all my
three children shall depart this life without leaving issue, lawfully begotten
and born of any of their bodies, and without appointing the dislosal of the
same, then, and in such case, I give," etc.
When the case was submitted, both Chief Justice Willes and
Justice Abney held that the gift over was a good executory devise.
Justice Burnett called their attention to the fact that the condition
which supported the executory devise was repugnant to the estate
devised. He said:-
"But I am clearly of opinion that this condition or cortingency,
annexed to the estate of the children, and precedent to that of the devisee's
estate, is a void condition, and consequently the devise dependent on it can
never take place. A condition, or contingency, repugnant to the estate
devised, must be void; thus a devise to one in fee, upon condition that he
shall not alien, is void. Co. Litt. 223. So a devise in fee, upon condition
that the wife shall not be endowed or, the husband be tenant by the curtesy,
is'void, because repugnant to the estate devised. 10 Co. Rep. 38, 6 Co. Rep.
41 a. So feoffment in fee, upon condition, that the feofee's daughters shall
not inherit, is void because repugnant to the nature of the estate.
1 8 DeGex, M. & G. 152,23 Ung. Rul. Cas. 54.
2 7 Ch. D. 669.
s (1746) 8 DeGex. M. & G. 167. 23 34ng. Rul. Cas. 65.
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"What is the condition here? That if Thomas dies without issue, his heirs
shall not take by descent but by aippointment, whereas a devise to a man's heir
at law, or grant to heirs, is void and he w11 take by descent. Hob. 30.
"In this case, therefore, a devise in fee, upon the condition thai his heirs
shall not take by descent, unless he especially alpoints them, is a void con-
dition, and consequently the devise subsisting on that condition is void."
The cases of Holmes v. Godson and Gulliver v. Vaux, are not in
conflict with Doe v. Glover, but the authority of the later case is
questioned by a remark made by Justice Bruce in his opinion in
Holmes v. Godson, that he must dissent from it if in conflict with his
present conclusion, but he added, that the two cases might be recon-
ciled.
There is no conflict between those cases. In Doe v. Glover, the
estate devised was a fee upon a conditional limitation, the condition
tipon which the limitation depended being the death of the donee
without issue. The donee was not prohibited from exercising any
right or power incident to the estate granted, and consequently the
condition was not repugnant to the grant. The court held that the
fact that the testator had given the donee power to alienate in fee,
did not enlarge the estate devised, but simply enabled him, by
exercising the power, to defeat the executory devise. In Holmes v.
Godson and Gulliver v. Vaux, the estate devised was a fee simple,
and the power to dispose of it by will or deed was incident to the
estate, and not held by the donee separate and apart from the
estate. The condition in each of the later cases upon which the
limitation depended was that the donee should not die intestate as
to the lands devised, a condition repugnant to the grant, and there-
fore the limitation was void.
In this country there are several decisions in direct conflict with
Doe v. Glover. One of the earliest is Ide v. Idel There the devise
was the same as in Doe v. Glover, an estate in fee with executory
devise over, if the devisee died without issue, of "what estate he
should leave." The court held that the words, "what estate he
should leave," gave the devisee, by implication, power to alienate
in fee, and that the executory devise was void. The court gave no
reason for its conclusion, and seems to have relied wholly upon
the althority of At'y. Gen. v. Hall.2  But that case is not in
point. There the testator gave: -
"All my real and personal estate unto my son, Francis Hall, and to the
heirs of his body, to his and their use. . . . and if my said son
Francis Hall, shall die, leaving no heirs of his body living, then I give and
1 5 Mass. 500 (1809). 2 itzg. 314.
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bequeath so much of my said real and personal estate, as my son shall be
possessed of at his death, to the Goldsmiths Company of London."
The son suffered a common recovery of the real estate, died
testate without issue, possessed of a portion of the personal property
devised. He made his widow executrix, and the Attorney General
filed a bill, on the relation of the Goldsmiths Company, for an
accounting. The court held that the will gave the son an estate tail
in the realty, and that the gift of the personalty was absolute. It
was a rule of law at that time, and a rule which remained in force
for more than a century afterwards, that where realty and person-
alty are devised together and an estate tail is given in the realty,
the gift of the personalty is absolute. The following is the opinion
of the court in full:-
"The court was unanimous that the limitation over was void, as an absolute
ownership had been given to F. H., forit is to him and the heiTs of his body,
and the company are to have no more than he shall have left unspent; and
therefore he had a power, to dispose of the whole; which power was not
expressly given to him, but it resulted from his interest. The words that give
an estate tail in the land must transfer the entire property of the personal
estate, and then nothing remaias to be given over.II
An estate in fee tail cannnot be devised upon a conditional limi-
tation, since the power to suffer a common recovery is incident to
that estate and cannot be restricted or suspended by the instrument
creating it.' In All'y Gen'l v. Hall the devisee took an estate tail
in the lands and a gift absolute in the personality, the power to
alienate in fee given the devisee of a determinable fee was not
therefore before the court and neither the principles of law involved
nor the language of the court, give the slightest support to Ide v.
Ide.
Ide v. Ide although resting altogether upon a misconception of
the principle laid down in Atl'y Gen'l v. Hall has since been fol-
lowed in Massachusetts with only now and then a mutter of protest.
In the late case of Kelly v. Meins,2 the court held that an otherwise
valid executory devise was made void by the testator giving the
devisee power to alienate in fee simple. The court cites Ide v. Ide
and several other decisions of its own and the following English
dses: Att'y Gen'l v. Hall,8 Holmes v. Godson,4 Gulliv r v.
Vaux;5 In re Wilcocks Settlement;6 In re Stringers Estae,7 and
Shaw v. Ford, 8 No further comment is necessary-upon Att'y Gen'l
I Corbet's Case, I Co 83. 2 135 Mass. 231. 3 Fitzg. 314.
4 8 DeGex. M. & G. 152. 6 8 id. 167. 6 1 Ch. Dlv. 229.
1 6Ch. Div. 1. 8 7 Ch. Div.669.
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v. Hall, Holmes v. Godson, and Gulliver v. Vaux. In the case of
In re Wilcocks Settlement,1 the testator gave certain personal prop-
erty to his illegitimate daughter for life and in the event she died
unmarried to her absolutely, provided that if she did not dispose of
such property, remainder over; the evident purpose of the testator
being to prevent the property going to the crown if the daughter died
intestate. The court held that the gift to the daughter was absolute
and consequently that there could be no remainder over. In In re
Stringers Estate,2 the testator gave real and personal property to
his brother with full power to dispose of the same by deed, will, or
otherwise provided that if he died not having so disposed of all the
property the remainder should go over. Here was an absolute gift
with a gift over. In Skaw v. lord,3 the testator gave certain lands
to his foilr sons, share and share alike, upon condition that they
should not divide the property without the written assent of all, and
lastly that if there was no lawful distribution, then at the death of
his sons the property should go to their issue and upon failure of
issue to, etc. Justice Fry said:
"Now the first question is, what estate do the four son take in this specifi-
cally devised property, before we come to that portion of the will which
gives it over in the event of there being no lawful distributions? In my
opinion the sons take estates in common in fee simple. I think that it isclear
they take, if at all, as tenants in common because they are to take 'share and
share alike.' ........ .There is, in my opinion, a devise of this par-
ticular property to the four sons as tenants in common in fee .....
The next inquiry is, what is the nature of the event which constitutes the
contingency upon which the executory devise is to take effect. It is if there is
no lawful distribution of the property amongst the four sons, in other words, in
the absence of a partition during their -joint lives. Now the right of all the
tenants in common of an estate is, if they so think fit, to enjoy it, not in
severalty, but as tenants in common of an undivided estate; and therefore the
contingency, in its nature, is the exercise of a right which attaches to every
tenant in common of an undivided estate."
This same rule was adopted by the courts of New York in an
early day. The leading cases are Jackson v. Bull,4 and
Jackson v. Robins.' Jackson v. Robins did not involve this
question, but the court seems to have thought it did. The tes-
tator gave his wife all his real and personal estate, "but in case of
her death without giving, devising, or bequeathing by will, or
otherwise selling or assigning the said estate or any part thereof,
then I do give, etc." The testator clearly gave the devisee an estate
I Ch. Div.229. 2 6Ch. Div. 1. 3 7 Ch. Div. 669.
S10 Johns 19 (1813). 5 15 Johns 169.
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in fee simple in the realty and an absolute gift of the personalty.
The condition or limitation supporting the executory devise was,
therefore, void. The case of Jackson v. Bull is directly in point
and on all fours with Ide v. Ide.1 The testator gave his son certain
lands and provided that if his son should die without issue the prop-
erty "he died possessed of" should go to X. Had the words "he
died possessed of" been omitted the executory devise would have
been good. Upon the death of the son without issue the estate
given him would have terminated. But the testator had by irnplica-
tion given his son power to alienate the lands devised in fee simple
and the court held that the power thus impliedly given defeated the
executory devise and cite as authority ide v. ide and AII'y Gen'l v.
Hall. The comments of the court in Jackson v. Bull upon Att'y
Gen'l v. Hall show that courts occasionally drop into error as
readily as sparks fly upward. After correctly stating that, in Att'y
Gen'l v. Hall, an estate tail was given in the realty and that the
devisee had barred the entail by suffering a common i ecovery the
court adds that:-
"The executrix was not to account for the personal estate to the persons
claiming under the limitations, for that was void as repugnant to the absolute
ownership and power of disposal given by the will.
"Lord Hardwicke has given his sanction to the accuracy of that case and
to the authority of that decision.' '2
Lord Hardwicke is correctly quoted; that eminent judge did say
in Flanders v. Clark:-
"It was determined by Lord King, that he (the devisee) had the absolute
property in the personalty, and therefoie the devise over was void: for he had
power to spend the whole, which was an absolute gift."
The court when it decided the case of Jackson v. Bull probably
did not have access to the report of the case of Alt'y Gen'l v. Hall
and relied upon Lord Hardwicke's declaration, or, what the reporter
made him declare. The only conclusion to be drawn from that
language of Lord Hardwicke is that the court held in AIt'y Gen'l
v. Hall that because the devisee was given power to dispose of the
personal property therefore the gift was absolute, when in fact the
court found that the gift was absolute and therefore the devisee had
power to sell.
The court in Jackson v. Bull, perhaps relying upon Lord Hard-
wicke's misleading comments upon Att'y Gen'l v. Hall, fastened
the rule upon New York for more than seventy years. When a
2 Flanders v. Clark. I yes. Sr. 9.1 5 mass. 5M.
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judicial train is once derailed, whether the accident is due to color
blindness, or an open switch, the courts are always loth to use
the only wrecking machinery in their possession, reversal of a
former decision. The legislature finally came to the rescue in New
York and declared by statute that the gift of power to alienate in
fee should not destroy an executory devise. The last case main-
taining the rule in Ide v. Ide is l'anHoi ne v. Camfibell.1 After that
statute took effect this same question came again before the court in
Greyston v. Claik,2 and Lgg ill v. Firtl. 3  The opinion in Grey-
slon v. Clark, written by Justice Peckham, now a member of the
United States supreme court, does not speak kindly of the defunct
rule. He says :-
"The plain intent of the testator was prevented from taking effect because
it violated a wholly articial and technical rule, not founded, as I think, upon
any public policy or sound reasoning."
He might have added that it was not founded upon any well con-
sidered opinion and originated in every instance in a misconception
of some previous decision.
Having fully discussed All'y Gen'l v. Hall, Ide v. ide and Jack-
son v. Bull, it is not necessary to call attention to a large number of
decisions in this country that have followed Ide v. Ide and Jackson
v. Bull. They all stand for a sure foundation upon those cases and
lean upon each other for support.
There seems to be no foundation in reason for this rule. The
condition whiich supports the executory devise is not
repugnant to the estate granted, a determinable fee, since there
isno power, incident to that estate, to convey in fee. To assert, as
some courts have done, that, where an executory devise is created,
the devisee cannot be given power to defeat such executory devise
and therefoie if he is given that power the devise over is void, is
simply begging the question. As a rule the mere possession of a
naked power to convey or mortgage, does not affect the estate in
the lands to be conveyed or mortgaged, under the power, no matter
who holds that estate. The power to alienate being incident to
the ownership of a fee simple, the owner may convey by himself or
another in his lifetime. If he gives the power to another, the con-
ferring of The power does not pass the estate or have the slightest
effect upon it. The owner, again, may devise his estate cutting it
up into two estates, a life estate and a remainder, and he may give
to each devisee power to alienate the estate given him. And he
1 100 N, Y. 287 (1855). 2 41 Hun. 125. 8 132 N. Y. 7.
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may go a step further; he may give the devisee of the life estate
absolute power to dispose of the remainder. Here we have a life
estate with power in the tenant for life to convey in fee and defeat
the remainder over. In such a case there are not only two separate
and distinct estates, the life estate and the remainder, but a power
to convey in fee which is not incident to either, but has been given
the life tenant separate and apart from his estate. Perhaps it would
be more correct to say, that the remainder has been given shorn of
the power to alienate and that such power has been conferred upon
the life tenant. But the mere possession of that power by the life
tenant does not enlarge his estate, nor does it diminish the estate of
the remainder man. If the tenant for life exercises the power and
alienates in fee, the grantee takes the entire estate and the remain-
der over is defeated. But if the tenant dies, not having exercised
the power, his death terminates both the life estate and the power
and the remainder man takes the estate devised, or so much as the
life tenant has not alienated. It is true that there are a few cases
which hold that when a life estate is granted with power to alienate
in fee, the devisee takes a fee simple. The great weight of author-
ity is in accordance with the rule stated.'
When the power to convey in fee si mple is not held separate and dis-
tinct from the estate but is incident to an estate less than a fee sim-
ple, the possession of the power by the tenant does not, by its own
virtue and'puissant force, enlarge his estate into the one he can con-
vey. His estate remains the same. Thus a tenant in tail has power
to suffer a common recovery and alienate in fee simple and that
power is incident to the estate tail and cannot be separated from
it. 2 Unless the tenant suffers a common recovery however, the
entail is not barred and may continue forever.
There is nothing in the nature of a determinable fee compared with
a life estate which discloses any reason why a life estate is immune
to the effects of a power to convey in fee and the determinable fee
is certain to fall a victim to its baleful influence. If a life estate is
given to A and an estate upon a conditional limitation to B, A's
estate will certainly terminate with his life and B's may. A cannot
I The following are a few of the recentcases upon that point:-Schlmpf v. Rhodewald, 86
N.W. 908 (Neb.); Swarthout v. Swarthout, 86 N.W-.58 (Wis.); Sawin v. Cormier. 60 N. E. 936
(Mass.): Jenkins v. Compton, 123 Ind. 117; Glover v. Reid, 80 Mich. 228: Cox v. Sims. 125Pa.
St. 522: Munro v. Collins, 95 Mo. 33; Wooster v. Cooper, 53 N. J. tq. 682. Hall v. Otis, 71
Me. 326.
2 Corbets Case. 1 Co. R. 83.
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defeat the remainder; neither can B defeat the executory devise. A
cannot commitwaste, or injure the inheritance. Hemay work mines
already opened, for in doing that he is merely using the estate in its
present condition, but he may not open new mines. In this respect
B has greater rights. He may commit waste; cut and sell timber;
open mines; and the court will not restrain him even when the
minerals constitute the principal, if not the sole value of the land.1
The reason why the court will not interpose to protect the execu-
tory devisee is, because his interest is uncertain,amere possibility.
The powers therefore of the tenant of a determinable fee to enjoy
his estate and to consume, if need be, the corpus itself, are much
greater than those possessed by the tenant of a life estate. How
then can it be said that the life tenant may be given the power to
alienate in fee and be still merely a tenant for life, but if like power
is given the tenant of a determinable fee, he becomes at once tenant
in fee simple?
To devise an estate upon a conditional limitation and give the
devisee, in addition to the determinable fee, the power to alienate
in fee simple does not violate any rule of property or any rule of
law. All rules of law established by the courts for the enjoyment
and transfer of estates in land, worthy of that designation, have
for their primary, if not their sole object, the protection of the rights
of the private owner and the interests of the public. To pro-
tect the private owner in the full enjoyment of all the privileges inci-
dent to his estate, is the origin of the rule of property that any
effort on the part of the grantor or testator to suspend or withhold
the power to exercise those rights is void as being repugnant to the
grant. The interests of the public are best subserved by having the
free alienation of estates in land as little trammeled as possible and
consequently the courts have adopted the rule that the grantor or
testator cannot suspend the power to alienate the estate given for a
longer period than lives in being and twenty-one years and a few
months thereafter. If the power to alienate in fee is given the
devisee of a determinable fee, which of these rules of property, or
rules of law, have been violated? The right of the devisee to fully
enjoy his estate, a determinable fee, has not been abridged or in any
manner sufspended. It has been greatly enlarged. He cannot
complain. Ie needs no protection. And so far as the public
interests are involved they have not been put in jeopardy. If the
devisee had not been given the power to alienate in fee simple, the
I Ganson v. Peterson, 193 I. 372.
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power to so alienate would have been suspended for the period
of one life, at least. When he is given that power there is no sus-
pension for a single moment. The only person who can be injured
is the person who would take if the estate devised should terminate
upon the happening of the event upon which it was limited. This
rule that the power to alienate in fee, defeats the executory devise
was not made, certainly, for his protection. Such a person is not
given much at best, a mere possibility, and when the power is con-
ferred upon the first devisee to defeat that possibility there is barely
the savor of his possible feast left, and then comes this rule and
fumigstes that away. In short this rule, which is founded neither
upon principle, authority, nor reason, is never invoked to protect
any pullic or private right but always to defeat the clearly expressed
intent of the testator and to deprive some object of the testator's
bounty of the benefit of a possible gift.
It would seem that the statutes of descent in many of the states
have by implication abrogated the rule laid down in ide v. Ide and
Jackson v. Bull. Those statutes provide in substance that if a minor
child dies unmarried his estate shall go to his father, unless such
estate was inherited from a deceased parent, in which case it shall
go to his brothers and sisters of the full blood. Massachusetts has
such a statute but the attention of the court has, apparently, never
been called to it, when this rule was under consideration. It will
be observed that, under such a statute, if a mother dies intestate leav-
ing several minor children and one of the children dies in infancy,
the estate it inherited from the mother goes to the deceased infant's
brothers and sisters, while if the mother dies testate all the estate
devised by her to such infant descends to the father. It becomes
necessary, therefore, if the mother should desire that the property
devised by her to one of her children shall go, in case of his death
before he attains the age of twenty-one, to his brothers and sisters
as provided for by the statute, that she give the child an estate
determinable upon his death under age, with an executory devise
over to his brothers and sisters. Such an executory devise is good.
But in that case the estate could not be disposed of in fee simple
for the benefit of the infant or his estate, and under the statute of
descents he would inherit from his mother an estate in fee which
might be sold at any time by order of the court in fee and only
what remained undisposed of would descend to the brothers and
sisters. How can this beneficial provision of the statute be attained
by the mother through her will? If the rule in Ide v. 1de did not
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stand in the way the mother could give the child a determinable fee
with power to alienate in fee, with an executory devise over to
his brothers and sisters of what remained undisposed of in the event
of his death under age. This rule, however, makes the executory
devise void and the child would take under such a will a fee sim-
ple, and in case he died during infancy his estate would go to his
father under the statute and not to his brothers and sisters.
We say it would seem that these statutes have by implication
abrogated the rule laid down in ide v. Ide. It is not probable that
any court will -hold, when its attention is called to such a statute of
descents, that a testator cannot by will provide for the support of a
child by the sale in fee of the lands devised him in the manner regu-
lated by law and also provide that what remains undisposed of shall
go, in case of death during infancy, to the very persons designated
to take when the estate is inherited, because such a disposition of
his estate would violate a rule of law. The statute of descents is
the will which the people have made for every person who does not
make one for himself. This provision of the statutory will we are
considering is identical with those before the court in ide v. ide and
Jackson v. Bull. It provides that a person's real and personal estate
shall be divided among his children, share and share alike, to them
and their heirs forever, provided that if any one of the children
shall die before attaining the age of twenty-one what remains of his
estate "undisposed of" shall go to his brothers and sisters.
f a testator, in a state where the rule laid. down in de v. Ide is in
force, desires to devise property to A and give him absolute domin-
ion over the same during his life and to provide that in case A dies
without issue such property orso much as remains undisposed of
shall go to B, he must give a life estate with unlimited power to
alienate, remainder to A's children and in default of children
remainder to B. Under such a devise, however, A could not com-
mit waste, nor could he devise such an estate by will.
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